The Condolence Message Of Mr. Luis Ayala, Secretary General Of Socialist International To Khalid Aziz Secretary General of KDP
The Reality About USA, Iran, Assad and The Nuclear Agreement ...
By : Massoud Mohamad
American and Iranian spokesmen deny that there is active collaboration, but for the moment they are pursuing parallel politics toward each other. Communicating their intentions through third parties and intelligence services. This is not exactly new, Iraqis has always said cynically that when it comes to Iraq, " the Iranians and the Americans shout at each other over the table, but shake hands under it". Such conspiracy theories can be carried too far, but it is true that, when it comes to relations between the U.S. And it's European allies on the one side , and Iran and the Syrian government on the other, there is a large gap today than ever before between what Washington says and what it does.
Syria the gate of Iran to the Middle East shores,
The Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as possible while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its regional interests should Assad fall. The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military in order to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power. These efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement forces. The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces to conflict abroad is a notable expansion of Iran’s willingness and ability to project military force beyond its borders. Iran has been providing essential military supplies to Assad, primarily by air. Opposition gains in Syria have interdicted many ground resupply routes between Baghdad and Damascus, and the relative paucity of Iranian port-visits in Syria suggests that Iran’s sea-lanes to Syria are more symbolic than practical. The air line of communication between Iran and Syria is thus a key vulnerability for Iranian strategy in Syria. Iran would not be able to maintain its current level of support to Assad if this air route were interdicted through a no-fly zone or rebel capture of Syrian airfields. Iran is also assisting pro-government shabiha militias, partly to hedge against Assad’s fall or the contraction of the regime into Damascus and a coastal Alawite enclave. These militias will become even more dependent on Tehran in such a scenario, allowing Iran to maintain some ability to operate in and project force from Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah began to take on a more direct combat role in Syria as the Assad regime began losing control over Syrian territory in 2012. Hezbollah has supported Assad with a robust, well-trained force whose involvement in the conflict aligns with Iranian strategic interests as Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged in his speeches. Hezbollah’s commitment is not without limitations, however, because Nasrallah must carefully calibrate his support to Assad with his domestic responsibilities in order to avoid alienating his core constituency in Lebanon. Iraqi Shi‘a militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate of Syrian and foreign Shi‘a fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraq-based Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Like other paramilitary forces operating in Syria, these militants escalated their involvement as the conflict descended into civil war. The open participation of Iraqi Shi‘a militants in Syria is an alarming indicator of the expansion of sectarian conflict throughout the region. The Syrian conflict has already constrained Iran’s influence in the Levant, and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehran’s ability to project power. Iran’s hedging strategy aims to ensure, however, that it can continue to pursue its vital interests if and when the regime collapses, using parts of Syria as a base as long as the Syrian opposition fails to establish full control over all of Syrian territory.
Is Iran going to allow the fall of Assad? An Iranian opposition leader told me, “This is one of the biggest battles in the history of the Middle East. Thousands of people are giving their lives to defend what they believe in. This is happening on both sides — we believe we are the righteous and so does the other side. It’s not an easy task for anyone to blow himself up in a battle [rebel fighters], neither is it to stay for months away from their families. In the end there will be a victorious side and we hope it’s us. The Iranian opposition leader said, “The enemies of Iran are trying to wage a psychological war on the resistance bloc by saying we are deserting Syria and giving it up in a bargain for a nuclear deal. But Syria was never on the table. The whole bloc is giving blood there and our blood isn’t so cheap to sell for a deal that the United States needs more than we do. In Syria we are fighting a holy war, a war to save this area from those who believe in the wrong version of Islam, from Wahhabism that’s against both Sunnis and Shiites. Should this war be one for the sake of a president and a regime, it shouldn’t have even happened. In Syria we are fighting for Islam, for the region, and we believe this as we believed in the 1979 [Iranian] revolution.
Why America needs Iran And pushed for the nuclear agreement? U.S. engagement in the Middle East over the past quarter century is what you may call it imperial overstretch, which means a great power’s expansion of strategic ambitions and commitments beyond its capacity to sustain In the U.S. case, trying to remake and, ultimately, subordinate the Middle East through military campaigns and other forms of coercive intervention has not just failed; it has been profoundly self-damaging to America’s strategic position, by seeking to dominate the region — in the process imposing missions on U.S. armed forces that not even the world’s most powerful military could accomplish, squandering vast human and material resources on a scale that not even the world’s largest economy could sustain, and eviscerating the perceived legitimacy of U.S. purposes for the vast majority of Middle Easterners — America has made itself weaker.
To recover, Washington must embrace a new Middle East strategy — one aimed not at coercive dominance but at a reasonably stable balance of power in which major regional states check one another’s reckless impulses. Such a strategy requires two things:
First, Washington needs to engage — positively and comprehensively — with all important regional actors. Second, Washington needs to recalibrate relations with America’s traditional Middle Eastern allies — most notably, Israel and Saudi Arabia. A robust diplomatic opening to Iran is essential to both these tasks. Whether American elites like it or not, Iran is an unavoidable power in today’s Middle East. The Islamic Republic’s influence is due to its revolutionary commitment to independence and its participatory Islamist order (not despite these things). Its influence is, therefore, rising in arenas across the region — and will continue to do so when and as Middle Eastern Muslims gain greater access to participatory politics. This prompts increasingly alarmist warnings from Israel, Saudi Arabia and their mouthpieces that Iranian “proxies” are “gobbling up the Middle East.” In fact, Tehran has grown its influence by supporting unavoidable constituencies marginalized by unrepresentative power structures.
Iran did not create Shi’a majorities in Iraq and Bahrain, or Lebanon’s Shi’a plurality; it did not invent Yemen’s Zaidi community (the Houthis’s base) or occupied Palestinians. But Tehran has pushed these constituencies organize to press their legitimate grievances — so that virtually any expansion of political participation in these venues empowers Iranian allie.
This approach makes it impossible to circumscribe Iranian influence over time. America must recognize that influence as an indispensable factor in regional politics. Washington needs positive relations with Tehran not only to fight common foes like the Islamist State, but also to promote genuine regional security. To these same ends, Washington should look soberly at its allies’ regional impact. To reduce the mounting costs that Israeli and Saudi policies impose on America’s position in the Middle East, Washington needs to reduce its dependence on Israel and Saudi Arabia. A rising Iran could be very helpful in checking the counter-productive policies of America’s traditional regional allies.Today, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia truly represents most of those it governs; neither can endorse more participatory. Likewise, neither can compete with Iran’s capacity to exercise positive political influence and facilitate real conflict resolution in contested regional arenas; on their own, Israel and Saudi Arabia can only make things worse. And, regardless of whatever various segments of America’s political class may perceive Israel and Saudi Arabia to have done for the United States, both pursue policies harmful to U.S. interests (e.g., Israel’s open-ended occupation of Arab populations and aggressive military posture; Saudi Arabia’s accused of supporting violent Sunni jihadis and suppression of moderate Sunni Islamists across the region willing to compete for power. That's why America went strongly for the deal with Iranians. Americas key allies in the Gulf, and Israel acted strongly against the nuclear agreement. Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu stepped up his attack on a nascent deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program, calling the framework agreement announced in Switzerland “a very bad deal”. Natanyahu tweeted in Farsi to persuade Iranians nuclear deal is bad he repeated his argument that a deal would pave the way for Iran to get nuclear bombs and “billions of dollars for terrorism”, and that the Tehran leadership should not be engaged diplomatically while it orchestrates anti-American “hate marches” on the streets. America’s other key allies across the Middle East—such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—are just as distraught. These nations’ ties with Washington have already frayed in recent years, dented by what many officials in the region describe as a nagging sense that America doesn’t care about this part of the world anymore. Now, with the nuclear agreement, these allies—particularly in the Gulf—fret that America is about to ditch its long-standing friends to win love from their common foe, at the very moment that this foe is on the offensive across the region.
The above explains some strange contradictory actions?
1- Not arming the moderate revolutionary forces in Syria.
2- Not Arming the kurdish peshmergas.
3- Prolonging the duration of war in Syria, not allowing the Assad fall.
4- Giving full hand to Iran in Iraq.
Assad is a need for Iran to maintain its influence, a collapsing Assad will give negative result to Iran expansion strategy. Assad must stay In spite of the fact announced by Staffan de Mistura, the U.N.’s special envoy to Syria, who said that the conflict in Syria must end. He called the Syrian war the “largest humanitarian tragedy since World War II” and described the suffering and fear of the civilians facing barrel bombs, mortars, kidnappings and detention as a “disgrace…it is a true tragedy.” The double moral American attitude allows ignoring the tragedy and acting as-if it never happened.
America Iran love relationship culminated in the declaration of the nuclear deal.
The questions that arises?
To what extend America key allies would surrender and accept Iran as a partner in ruling the region?
Iran natural allies Assad, Hezbollah, Yemen Houthis how would they fit in the new puzzle?
Is Sykes Picot agreement over and are we going to watch the emergence of new states?
What Role the Iranian opposition will play in nonnuclear Iran?
Time will tell so far it looks like a win win situation but nothing is final in the American politics.